The article intends to provide a first, partial contribution to a very topical historiographic question, that of the relationship between crisis and normative reforms. These can be interpreted in two different but at the same time complementary ways: on the one hand, as a political reaction induced by the difficulties of the credit institutions and by the social consequences of the crises; on the other, as the interplay between divergent interests and theoretical approaches, i.e. as an asset whose quantity depends on regulation demand and supply. The analysis, which is the first phase of a research in progress, starts from one of the most studied episodes of banking legislation in Italy, that of 1936, ordering the events in their essential lines and integrating current knowledge with some archival sources. We will therefore try to propose some ideas that allow us to better delineate the mechanisms underlying the reform process, as well as the reactions it raised among the various groups involved, with the emphasis on the contrasts between the regulatory framework and market incentives. This study shows a relationship between crisis and regulation that is more multifaceted than one might imagine, and which leaves room for further research in this direction.
|Translated title of the contribution||[Autom. eng. transl.] When the market doesn't work. For a research on banking regulation in Italy in the 1936 law|
|Number of pages||12|
|Journal||STUDI STORICI LUIGI SIMEONI|
|Publication status||Published - 2020|
- Banking regulation