[Autom. eng. transl.] The summer of 2017 ideally represented the highest moment of a parable that saw the Kurdish communities of Syria and Iraq return to the center of international attention. With the release of Mosul from the grip of the self-styled Islamic State (IS) in June 2017, the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan in Iraq (KRI) appeared to be near historic independence. On the Syrian side, however, the encirclement of the last strongholds of the "Caliphate" and the solid partnership woven with Washington seemed to consolidate the grip of the Kurdish formations on the territories of the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Rojava. In both contexts, and beyond the profound fragmentation that had affected Iraq and Syria, the contribution made by the Kurdish units in the fight against the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi militias was decisive. The very tough clash waged against jihadist forces had (re) discovered for large sections of the international public the instances of communities that had long been forgotten, if not openly sacrificed in favor of relations with local actors considered far more relevant . The last bulwark capable of containing the IS offensive remained in many theaters, the different expression forces of the Kurdish communities of Syria and Iraq had become fundamental partners in the fight against the "Caliphate", so as to push an increasing number of chancelleries to tighten increasingly close relationships with these actors. Yet within a few months, this scenario had changed dramatically. The choice of the KRI leadership to hold a referendum on the independence of the region soon proved to be a tragic mistake. As expected, the victory at the polls of the independence front had done nothing but strengthen the positions of its main opponents. Under the joint pressure of Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, and in the face of deep internal divisions, the units that guarded the key city of Kirkuk had had to abandon their positions; all in the complete and deafening silence of the international community. With the loss of the "Kurdish Jerusalem", the essential element of the independence project was lost. The region thus returned to the "borders" of 2003, torn by a profound crisis which threatened to cast doubt on its own cohesion. On the Syrian front, however, the victory achieved by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Raqqa (October 2017) inaugurated the final phase of the campaign against IS, but also a new chapter in the clash with Ankara, which has always been hostile to the rooting of a reality considered as a mere extension of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) along its southern borders. After removing the canton of Afrin from the SDF in March 2018 and threatening direct confrontation with the historic American ally if it did not revise its policy in the area, Erdogan collected, in December of the same year, the promise of the Trump Administration to withdraw their contingents stationed east of the Euphrates. A move considered by many as a sort of "green light" to Ankara's plans and as yet another demonstration of Washington's inconstancy, ready to sacrifice their occasional allies (the SDF) on the altar of interests considered to be priorities (the partnership with Turkey). However decisive, however, it would be wrong to attribute the responsibility for the crisis that has affected the Syrian-Iraqi Kurd communities to external factors only. Behind an apparent facade of unity, in fact, they had to deal with deeply diverging internal agendas and with a system of external relations deeply articulated and marked by conflicting visions, which often ended up marking their freedom of freedom in a decisive way. action.
|Translated title of the contribution||[Autom. eng. transl.] What future for the Kurds from Syria to Iraq|
|Number of pages||7|
|Journal||VITA E PENSIERO|
|Publication status||Published - 2019|
- Stati Uniti