Pluralismo ontologico e ontologia della sostanza. La critica di Putnam alla tesi quineana sull’indeterminatezza della traduzione

The paper provides an interpretation of Putnam’s ontological pluralism as articulated in the\r\nPhilosophical Papers and The Meaning and the Moral Sciences, with respect especially to\r\nQuine’s ontological relativity. The model-theoretic argument is usually taken to support an\r\nanti-realist ontological view analogous to Quine’s, on which determining the meaning of\r\nwords univocally is impossible. Contrary to this view, the paper argues that Putnam’s criticism\r\nof the indeterminacy of translation shows that the rejection of metaphysical realism\r\ndoes not amount to an anti-realist view. Rather, Putnam proposes a ‘sophisitcated’ realism\r\nadmitting of a plurality of equivalent and mutually irreducible descriptions of the same\r\nfact. The paper concludes by pointing out that the compatibility between ontological pluralism\r\nand realism is the result of a synthesis of Aristotelianism and Kantianism obtained\r\nthanks to the mediation of pragmatism.