Abstract
According to a common interpretation, Enriques’ efforts to make widespread
a model of philosophy open to dialogue with science were hampered by Croce, who
supported an obsolete form of humanism tending to deny the epistemological value of
science and, as a consequence, to reject all collaboration or even any communication
between science and philosophy. However, this reconstruction of the polemical argument
between the two thinkers in the two-year period 1911-1912 is incorrect. This is
because Croce’s doctrine of the economic-practical value of science was in line with
the prevailing trends within the international epistemological debate at that time,
trends that Croce knew very well and appreciated. He opposed Enriques’ project not
out of an indiscriminate aversion to scientific culture, but due to the fact that, though
mistakenly, he saw Enriques’ quite anti-conventionalist and anti-pragmatist realism as
a recovery of the old form of positivism.
Translated title of the contribution | [Autom. eng. transl.] For a reinterpretation of the Croce-Enriques controversy |
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Original language | Italian |
Pages (from-to) | 225-235 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Rivista di Storia della Filosofia |
Volume | 69 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Keywords
- conventionalism
- epistemology
- idealism
- positivism
- pragmatism
- realism