On spatial competition with quadratic transport costs and one online firm

Stefano Colombo, Zemin Hou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Guo and Lai (2014) argue that, under quadratic transport costs, when two offline firms compete with one online firm, the two offline firms locate in such a way that they occupy unconnected regions in the market. However, we offer a counterexample to show that their provided condition is not sufficient to support existence of subgame perfect equilibria, because location deviations to different market structures are not taken into account.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-247
Number of pages7
JournalTHE ANNALS OF REGIONAL SCIENCE
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Keywords

  • location-price game

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