Observable and Renegotiable Contracts as Commitments to Cooperate

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We study an example of strategic delegation in Cournot duopoly and show that if contracts are both observable and renegotiable before becoming common knowledge at the outset of the delegated game, the strategic value of contracts is preserved, but the set of equilibria is greatly enlarged. Managerial contracts can be used by owners to co-ordinate on any product market equilibrium allowing them to get a level of profit at least as large as the profit obtainable in the strategic delegation equilibrium without renegotiation, which is used as a threat point. The equilibrium set includes joint profit maximisation.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages28
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Keywords

  • COOPERATION
  • OBSERVABLE CONTRACTS
  • RENEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS

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