L’ombra del concetto: la riflessione kantiana di fronte al non-concettuale

[Autom. eng. transl.] If Kant's philosophy is so rigidly associated with the limit, this happens also because of the constant possibility of the non-conceptual that, in different areas of Kantian thought, returns to question the Königsberg thinker. The continuous Grenzbestimmung, to which Kant is prompted by this question, constitutes one of the most original traits of his thought. Thus, the conceptual emerges, from the general approach of the Kantian inquiry, as a dimension whose original inseparability must be reaffirmed, one might almost say defense, in the face of the multiple temptations of a knowledge without concept. The reflexive movement of recognition of the conceptual structure, beneath the elements that seem to lack it, refers to the concept of "form" as to what also the elements bearing a presumed irrational component, or rather a-rational, are subjects, due to the fact that they are within the possibility, guaranteed by the concept. The different areas with which the conceptual is confused from time to time, and which we have tried to analyze here, let us suppose the possibility of its transcendence, but the formal reflection movement reminds us that, in every case, we are dealing with concepts; and so, as in the most fascinating illusions, we discover that we have taken as a shadow a shadow, that of the non-conceptual, and, turning around, we recognize what generated it: the concept.