Abstract
[Autom. eng. transl.] Before the 'reversal' which, with the London pact, would have led Italy to side with the Entente Powers, the Triple Alliance constituted the privileged reference framework for the country's international action. Although this painting had somehow been affected by the 'waltz rounds' policy, it had not lost its centrality. In 1912 the treaty was renewed for the fourth time, in the 1902 formula and accompanied by an additional protocol with which Berlin and Vienna recognized Italian sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and reconfirmed the validity of the Balkan agreements concluded between Rome and Vienna in previous years . Despite the bad moods, the ties between the three courts seemed, therefore, sufficiently solid, also because 'the relations between Austria and Italy ... were such that a dilemma was placed rigidly: the two countries had to be either allies or enemies decided (Giolitti 1922). On the other hand, the process of decoupling Italy from an alliance perceived as excessively binding had already begun some time ago. The origins of the Triple crisis coincide, in fact, to a large extent, with the collapse of the crispino system (1896), within which the one with Germany and Austria-Hungary had assumed a value of total alliance, that is valid as an instrument of active politics also in the sectors not foreseen by the alliance [same] '(Serra 1990). The forecasts of points (2) and (3) of the Italo-Russian agreements of Racconigi (24 October 1909), with their reference to the principle of nationality as the inspiration for any change in the Balkan status quo, mark the point of greatest divergence between the positions in Rome and Vienna, even if they do not preclude the continuation of the negotiations that would have led the governments to sign, a few weeks after Racconigi, the agreements on the Sangiaccato of 20 November / 15 December 1909. At the outbreak of the war, this tension still appears to be unresolved. In December 1914, the action of the Foreign Minister Sonnino "reveals the absence of any taken party", despite being aware that the Italian position was "relatively obligatory" (Vigezzi, in Malagodi 1960). The rift between 'triplicists' and 'anti-triplicists' crosses vertically both the military and diplomatic worlds, as evidenced by the threatened or presented resignations of the Ambassadors in Vienna and Berlin (Avarna and Bollati) before the declaration of Italian neutrality. The mission in Rome of the ex-Chancellor von Bülow (18 December 1914-24 May 1915) therefore gets stuck - rather than in the (lukewarm) will of the Salandara government - in the ill-concealed suspicion of Vienna above all towards the German ally. Another sign - if any were needed - of the structural weakness in which the entire 'Triple' building was now located.
Translated title of the contribution | [Autom. eng. transl.] Italy and the Triple Alliance. Lights and shadows of a complex relationship |
---|---|
Original language | Italian |
Title of host publication | L'Italia e la Grande Guerra. La neutralità 1914-1915. La situazione diplomatica socio-politica economica e militare italiana |
Pages | 61-73 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Publication status | Published - 2015 |
Keywords
- Prima guerra mondiale
- Triplice alleanza