L'io legislatore di Kelsen. Alcune annotazioni teoriche

[Autom. eng. transl.] Is the Thomistic model of the natural moral law really contradictory as it appears to Kelsen? Does the simultaneous presence of conflicting tendencies in human nature make their normativity depend, as Kelsen would have it, on an implicit (and undue given the Thomistic assumptions) positive human act? The essay intends to answer these two questions, making Sofia Vanni Rovighi's moral approach interact with the Kelsen qualification of the human subject as legislator. The space that opens up for an anthropological enhancement of the human capacity to put laws is thus verified in its claim to be valid also in a moral key, in a perspective that leads to a reflection on the nature of the relationship between ethics and anthropology, against the background of the "great division "outlined by Hume.