TY - JOUR
T1 - Linearism, Universalism and Scope Ambiguities
AU - Frigerio, Aldo
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - In this paper, I distinguish two possible families of semantics of the open future: Linearism, according to which future tensesentences are evaluated with respect to a unique possible future history, and Universalism, according to which future tensesentences are evaluated universally quantifying on the histories passing through the moment of evaluation. An argument infavour of Linearism is based on the fact future tense does not exhibit scope interactions with negation. Todd (2020, 2021) defendsUniversalism against this argument proposing an error theory, according to which the speakers engaged in non-philosophicalconversations implicitly assume a linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, I show that an error theory is not needed for de-fending Universalism and that the scopelessness of negation can have another explanation. The absence of a wide-scope readingof negation characterises many other linguistic constructions: counterfactuals, vague predicates, generics and plural definite de-scriptions. My main thesis is that, their considerable differences aside, these constructions have something in common: they aretrue when the predicate applies to the members of a set, false when the predicate does not apply to the members of the set and in-determinate in the intermediate cases. When negation interacts with such constructions tends to take the narrow scope readingonly. I review two types of explanations for this behaviour, one semantic and the other pragmatic. Since this explanation for thescopelessness of negation is at least as good as that of Linearism, I conclude that the argument against Universalism is ineffective.
AB - In this paper, I distinguish two possible families of semantics of the open future: Linearism, according to which future tensesentences are evaluated with respect to a unique possible future history, and Universalism, according to which future tensesentences are evaluated universally quantifying on the histories passing through the moment of evaluation. An argument infavour of Linearism is based on the fact future tense does not exhibit scope interactions with negation. Todd (2020, 2021) defendsUniversalism against this argument proposing an error theory, according to which the speakers engaged in non-philosophicalconversations implicitly assume a linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, I show that an error theory is not needed for de-fending Universalism and that the scopelessness of negation can have another explanation. The absence of a wide-scope readingof negation characterises many other linguistic constructions: counterfactuals, vague predicates, generics and plural definite de-scriptions. My main thesis is that, their considerable differences aside, these constructions have something in common: they aretrue when the predicate applies to the members of a set, false when the predicate does not apply to the members of the set and in-determinate in the intermediate cases. When negation interacts with such constructions tends to take the narrow scope readingonly. I review two types of explanations for this behaviour, one semantic and the other pragmatic. Since this explanation for thescopelessness of negation is at least as good as that of Linearism, I conclude that the argument against Universalism is ineffective.
KW - metaphysical theories of the future
KW - semantics of future tense sentences
KW - open future
KW - negation
KW - metaphysical theories of the future
KW - semantics of future tense sentences
KW - open future
KW - negation
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/294836
UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phib.12362
U2 - 10.1111/phib.12362
DO - 10.1111/phib.12362
M3 - Article
SN - 2153-9596
SP - 1
EP - 13
JO - Analytic Philosophy
JF - Analytic Philosophy
ER -