Libertà e ragione nel dibattito bioetico: appunti sulla contraddittorietà apparente dell'esigenza razionale

[Autom. eng. transl.] One of the reasons for the current difficulty in ethical and bioethical discourse is given by the antecedence between ethical and theoretical reflection. That is to say: we immediately ask ourselves what we should do, without seriously questioning what it is we are thinking about. This is, moreover, a reflection of the transformation of the ethical question in the transition from classical to modern and then postmodern reflection: the question actually passes from "who should I be" (to be happy) to "what should I do", believing, in the wake of Kant, that the discourse on happiness is a source and expression of heteronomy. The present contribution proposes the juxtaposition of some points of the theoretical proposal of HTEngelhardt, Apel and Jonas to evaluate whether a reflection that denies knowledge (episteme) on the identity of man does not come to require it in the end, on pain of contradictory reason. the crushing of the subject.