La ricostruzione del fatto nel processo penale

[Autom. eng. transl.] If in the historical evolution the passage from the conception of proof as an argument to that of proof as proof is found, it is now necessary to combine the two perspectives by accepting a dialectical conception of proof. It implies the recognition of the judge's methodological neutrality in the reconstruction of the fact, which must however be considered reliable in order to recognize the justice of the decision. But the truth of the factual reconstruction, to be shared by all, must follow an epistemological neutrality of the process, since in a multicultural society some philosophical-gnosiological approaches cannot be privileged over others: the semantic conception of truth responds to this need. To obtain the latter, the proof is required, whose conceptual profiles and evaluation criteria are examined. A specific field of study is therefore identified in judicial epistemology, aimed at critically analyzing the methods and validity of judicial knowledge.