Abstract
[Autom. eng. transl.] The European Central Bank is not liable pursuant to art. 340, par. 3, TFEU for damages suffered by the investors involved in the restructuring of the Greek debt following the decision not to adhere to the public exchange offer promoted by the Greek Government, with the aim of restoring the financial balance of the country. In the exercise of its functions for the definition and implementation of the monetary policy choices of the Union, the European Central Bank enjoys a wide discretionary power, the exercise of which involves complex economic and social analysis, as well as the evaluation of situations susceptible of rapid evolution, since it is necessary to foresee and evaluate economic developments of a complex and uncertain nature (such as the evolution of the capital market, the money supply and the inflation rate), and to make political, economic and social choices, requiring the balancing and balancing of the various objectives set out in Article 127 (1) TFEU, the main one being the maintenance of price stability
Translated title of the contribution | [Autom. eng. transl.] The "responsibility" of the ECB in restructuring the Greek debt. From the illicit aquilian to the unjust enrichment |
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Original language | Italian |
Pages (from-to) | 153-166 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | BANCA BORSA E TITOLI DI CREDITO |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Azione generale di ingiustificato arricchimento
- Collective Action Clauses
- Divieto di facilitazioni creditizie
- Esclusione della BCE dalla ristrutturazione del debito
- Politica economica e monetaria
- Principio di attribuzione
- Private Sector Involvement
- Responsabilità extracontrattuale della BCE
- Ristrutturazione del debito pubblico greco
- Securities Markets Programme