La politica di remunerazione degli azionisti nelle società europee a controllo familiare

Translated title of the contribution: [Autom. eng. transl.] The shareholder remuneration policy in European family-owned companies

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Abstract

[Autom. eng. transl.] It is known that the "family" shareholder has peculiar characteristics in terms of risk aversion and individual preferences that sometimes could involve managerial decisions aimed at reconciling family interests with those of society. From an analysis on a closed sample of 777 listed European non-financial companies, significant differences emerge in the remuneration policies of family-controlled companies: on the one hand the lower propensity to buyback, on the other, a greater propensity to provide liquidity in excess through the payment of dividends. However, within family firms there is a noticeable difference between the companies headed by the founder and those managed by the heirs. The latter, in fact, show a greater propensity to disburse excess liquidity, having to satisfy the needs of a wider control group.
Translated title of the contribution[Autom. eng. transl.] The shareholder remuneration policy in European family-owned companies
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)27-40
Number of pages14
JournalBANCARIA
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Keywords

  • remunerazione degli azionisti

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