La disclosure sulla corporate governance nei gruppi, strumento di tutela di interessi diffusi. Un'analisi critica nel contesto italiano.

Translated title of the contribution: [Autom. eng. transl.] Disclosure on corporate governance in groups, an instrument for the protection of widespread interests. A critical analysis in the Italian context.

Anna Maria Fellegara, Pier Luigi Marchini, Veronica Tibiletti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The Italian mandatory regulation does not strictly define the concept of corporate groups, thus not allowing an immediate acknowledgement of the group structure. This circumstance makes it difficult to single out the economic decision responsibilities, so that minorities interests are less protected. In order to improve the groups ownership structure transparency, Italian Regulators recently issued a decree requiring groups to disclose, also in the financial statements, their subjection to a parent company. The paper aims to investigate the effectiveness and the quality of the groups corporate governance disclosure, focusing on the recent mandatory regulation impacts.
Translated title of the contribution[Autom. eng. transl.] Disclosure on corporate governance in groups, an instrument for the protection of widespread interests. A critical analysis in the Italian context.
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)9-35
Number of pages27
JournalFINANCIAL REPORTING
Volume2011
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Keywords

  • corporate disclosure
  • corporate governance
  • italian listed groups

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of '[Autom. eng. transl.] Disclosure on corporate governance in groups, an instrument for the protection of widespread interests. A critical analysis in the Italian context.'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this