Interpretation of psychological concepts in Wittgenstein

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Abstract

This paper focuses on Wittgenstein's notion of psychological concepts. According to the Austrian philosopher, it is only the Grammar to provide the means to properly interpret the psychological concepts, and the description of internal mental states is reduced to the description of the use of words. Psychological facts and phenomena are thus replaced with the notion of psychological concepts, which would exist only through linguistic expressions. The language is not conceived as a static image of logical rules far from the real contexts of interaction, but rather as a living entity which constantly transforms itself through its usage. Consequently, the meaning of a psychological concept, like any other linguistic expression, is strictly bounded to its ordinary usage.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLanguage and World. Proceedings of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium
Pages64-65
Number of pages2
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Event32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium - Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria
Duration: 9 Aug 200915 Aug 2009

Conference

Conference32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium
CityKirchberg am Wechsel, Austria
Period9/8/0915/8/09

Keywords

  • Language
  • Pragmatics
  • Psychology

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