[Autom. eng. transl.] If the indisputable merit of the text of Possenti is to vigorously relaunch the discussions on metaphysics, "realism", "metaphysics", "modern philosophy" nevertheless appear labels whose use requires a careful circumspection: the alternative goes from the empty name, that can stand for everything, the overdetermined name, with respect to which any comparison is impossible. Now the "direct realism" or "immediate" that Possenti proposes implies a "direct taking" of the cognitive faculties on the world and on being.1 Good: but the faculties those who exercise them? I hope that man responds: he who can understand being from abilities related to the subject itself and from principles on which being rests. The set of reality and its understanding are two aspects that cannot be worked out separately, it is worthwhile to fall into the classic gnoseological dualism or into a sort of self-evident intuition of reality that could manifest itself apart from a hypothetical spectator of his appearance. It seems to me that Possenti, while he has very clear the first problem, on the second acquires his attention, with the risk of losing what he intended to save, being precisely.
|Translated title of the contribution||[Autom. eng. transl.] Is realism a method?|
|Title of host publication||Realismo, metafisica, modernità. In margine al volume di Vittorio Possenti, Il realismo e la fine della filosofia moderna,|
|Editors||Riccardo Pozzo Maria Cristina Dalfino|
|Number of pages||18|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|