Il dispotismo della maggioranza. Brevi note a partire da Tocqueville

This paper considers some of the flaws of democracy, reflecting with Tocqueville, and, in part, beyond Tocqueville.\r\nMeanwhile, for various reasons the majority is not always morally unquestionable and not always right. \r\nAgain, already Tocqueville mentioned the problem of moral censure toward those who diverge from the majority opinion. \r\nIn addition, if the frame of ethical relativism prevails, then the logic of power and violence is more likely to prevail in a social body. For example, if a democracy disregards the truth about the good it runs the risk of falling into the majority despotism denounced by Tocqueville.\r\nMoreover, again for Tocqueville, There is a general law which has been made, or at least adopted, not only by the majority of this or that people, but by the majority of all men. This law is justice. Justice represents, therefore, the limit of the right of every people. The morality of democracy is not automatic, but is connected (also) to the ends it promotes and the means it employs to achieve them. Otherwise democracy runs the risk of being only apparent: the truth is that those who rule and decide are few and an oligarchy is in place.