Abstract
Do our moral judgments ─ for example "action X is good/evil" ─ designate real characteristics of actions, so that "good," "evil," and similar attributes are real properties of human acts, or moral judgments are merely expressions of the emotions we feel toward actions, and therefore good and evil do not objectively exist? The purpose of this paper is to report some of the considerations made by Alasdair MacIntyre on this question, on moral realism, emotivism and expressivism.
The paper discusses the relationship between moral judgments and emotions, then the question of moral properties, then sets out some objections to emotivism, and finally concludes with some clarifications on moral realism.
| Translated title of the contribution | [Autom. eng. transl.] Do good and evil really exist? MacIntyre, Emotivism and Expressivism |
|---|---|
| Original language | Italian |
| Pages (from-to) | 96-100 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | NUOVA SECONDARIA |
| Volume | 40 |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Keywords
- emotivism
- emotivismo
- espressivismo
- expressivism
- moral properties
- moral realism
- proprietà morali
- realismo morale