Gli USA e la “svolta” del 1917. Limiti e ambizioni dell’intervento statunitense

[Autom. eng. transl.] On a diplomatic level, the entry of the United States into the First World War is one of the characteristic events of 1917. Although the operational impact is limited (the first departments of the AEF come online in France only at the beginning of the following year ), the political and diplomatic scope of this event is difficult to downsize. With the declaration of war on April 6, the conflict evolved from a 'simple' power discount, in the line of the nineteenth-century 'Chancery wars', into 'constituent war', through which the defeat of 'Prussian militarism' would have paved the way for a post-war order based on 'peace without victory' and a 'safe for democracy' world. Furthermore, the union of these principles of the allied and associated powers definitively closes any possibility of reaching a compromise peace, as the experiences of the papal note of 1 August and of the attempt would have shown that year, for different reasons. of mediation by Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma. However, the US choice is not easy. It clashes on the one hand with the neutralist sentiments of large sections of the population, on the other with the limitations of a military device born and raised above all to satisfy the needs of internal security and to carry out limited policing activities in the traditional 'courtyards' '. With an industrial system committed to meeting the needs of European belligerents, the AEF would have encountered serious problems in arming and equipping itself, so as to have to rely - for its operations - on British and French supplies up to an advanced stage of the conflict. At the same time, the adoption of the disputed Selective Service Act would have opened the doors of the army to a large number of immigrants who - having grown up inside the ethnic townships ("Little Italy", "Little Odessa", "Kleine Deutschland" ...) - also thanks to this experience they would have acquired a growing awareness of their role in a society crossed by violent nativist impulses. The fact of qualifying the US as simple 'associated' with the war effort of the European powers and not as their 'allies' signals, finally, a distancing destined to be reflected on the one hand in the autonomy claimed and defended by the AEF commander ( General Pershing) and his political representatives, on the other in the position taken by President Wilson at the peace table. In fact, the association's ambiguous formula allowed Washington not to consider itself bound by the agreements concluded in previous years by European governments and the decisions taken jointly by them, while maintaining a certain influence on the conduct of the war and the definition of its objectives. General Pétain's invitation to 'wait for the carts and the Americans' as elements to resolve the conflict would have strengthened this position. A position that, initially accepted by the European Powers, would have been, however, increasingly resentful, until it resulted in open contrasts destined to punctuate the Paris Conference.