Giudizi morali e gerarchie emotive

Translated title of the contribution: [Autom. eng. transl.] Moral judgments and emotional hierarchies

Maria Grazia Rossi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


[Autom. eng. transl.] Both the thesis of morality as a moral canon and the thesis of the dependence of moral judgment on emotions are still at the center of a bitter controversy in philosophy and moral psychology. Starting from Darwin's observations, in this paper we will illustrate the terms of this controversy by only partially validating the theses of the English naturalist. More specifically, our conviction is that these two theses can be kept distinct and that even the validity of the second makes recourse to the first problematic: the models of morality change as a consequence of the role one is willing to recognize in emotions. Against a model of morality as a moral canon we will argue that human morality should be interpreted rather in terms of a plurality of values, perceived and organized hierarchically because they depend on the underlying hierarchical organization of our emotional devices.
Translated title of the contribution[Autom. eng. transl.] Moral judgments and emotional hierarchies
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)233-240
Number of pages8
Publication statusPublished - 2013


  • Emotions
  • Emozioni
  • Giudizi morali
  • Intuitionism
  • Intuizionismo
  • Moral Judgment
  • Rationalism
  • Razionalismo


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