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Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)338-346
Number of pages9
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume29
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Keywords

  • Horizontal differentiation
  • Symmetry
  • Tacit collusion

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