Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents

Gianluca Femminis, Giulio Piccirilli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in information acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-4
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume207
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Keywords

  • Heterogeneous agents
  • Information acquisition
  • Welfare

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