Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract

Michele Grillo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Extending some results of the economic theory of incomplete contracts to the analysis of political exchange, the contribution argues that the constitutional principle of isonomia - that is, the separation of legislature and government, which leads to democratically elected governments being subject to 'equal laws' - is a necessary condition for the optimal working of representative democracy.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUnderstanding Democracy
EditorsALBERT BRETON, GIANLUIGI GALEOTTI, PIERRE SALMON, RONALD wINTROBE
Pages47-63
Number of pages17
Publication statusPublished - 1997

Keywords

  • democracy
  • incomplete contracts

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