Debt Maturity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Efficiency

Samuele Murtinu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2610-2616
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume35
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Agency conflicts
  • Agency cost
  • Bank debt
  • Corporate control
  • Corporate governance
  • Credit market
  • Debt maturity
  • Entrepreneurial firm
  • Firm efficiency
  • Firm performance
  • High-technology
  • Individual shareholder
  • Monitoring
  • Owner-manager
  • Ownership concentration
  • Ownership structure
  • Shareholders
  • Short-term effect
  • Unlisted firm

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