Dalla teoria dei ‘segnali di allarme’ alla realtà dell’imputazione dolosa nel concorso dell’amministratore non esecutivo ai reati di bancarotta

Translated title of the contribution: [Autom. eng. transl.] From the theory of 'alarm signals' to the reality of willful indictment in the competition of the non-executive director in bankruptcy

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Abstract

[Autom. eng. transl.] The author deals with the phenomenon of warning signs that emerge within complex organizations and reach the so-called non-executive administrators, to examine in which cases and under what conditions a reproach can be formulated for them for not having seized or taken charge of the signal and not having prevented the generated alarm from being resolved in the crime committed by third parties.
Translated title of the contribution[Autom. eng. transl.] From the theory of 'alarm signals' to the reality of willful indictment in the competition of the non-executive director in bankruptcy
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)905-940
Number of pages36
JournalRIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA'
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Keywords

  • amministratori non esecutivi
  • bancarotta
  • colpa
  • concorso di persone
  • dolo
  • reati fallimentari
  • segnali di allarme

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