Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing

Luigi Filippini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)201-210
Number of pages10
JournalINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
Volume5
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Keywords

  • cournot
  • cross licencing

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this