Competition between Accounting Standards in National Contexts: Does Family Matter?

This study investigates the competition between accounting rules in national contexts. Following the introduction of non-mandatory simplified accounting rules, which are intended to reduce the burden of administrative costs for small and medium companies, competition between national GAAPs has arisen. Generally, SMEs are expected to prefer the simpler and less expensive rules. However, they may voluntarily choose the ordinary ones if the related benefits are perceived to outweigh their costs. Combining Agency Theory and Socioemotional Wealth Theory, we posit that the choice is influenced by agency relationships and ownership structure. The analysis of a sample of 6.052 Italian SMEs reveals that companies which opted for ordinary rules are less indebted, present a higher number of non-family related directors and operate in complex social environments. These results suggest that SMEs’ accounting choices are not directly intended to reduce agency costs, while they reflect both the availability of resources for the preparation of comprehensive financial statements and firms’ internal and external complexity. Focusing on SMEs, this study aims to expand existing knowledge about the accounting choice of a type of companies that are still underinvestigated, despite being an important component of the economic system in many countries.