Given a parent-subsidiary scheme, the paper analyses the limits according to Italian company law (artt. 2497 ss. civil code) of the parent company’s power towards subsidiary’s directors to impose strategical directives about the course of action of the subsidiary. Considering the law, it is possible to argue that in the parent-subsidiary scheme the interest of the subsidiary is no more the exclusive interest to be pursued and therefore the intrusion of the parent interest allow, although with very strict limits, to allocate risk in a suboptimal way for the subsidiary.
|Translated title of the contribution||[Autom. eng. transl.] Management and coordination and allocation of management risk|
|Title of host publication||Società, Banche e Crisi d'impresa. Liber Amicorum Pietro Abbadessa|
|Editors||ANTONELLA SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI, VINCENZO CARIELLO, FABRIZIO GUERRERA, Mario Campobasso, VINCENZO DI CATALDO|
|Number of pages||23|
|Publication status||Published - 2014|
- Gruppi di società
- Risk allocation