Abstract
The concept of a repeated game is introduced and applied to the case of the centipede, the finite and the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The consequences of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are outlined. A concept of reasonableness is introduced and some of its effects are discussed.
| Translated title of the contribution | [Autom. eng. transl.] Notes on games and institutions: The repeated games |
|---|---|
| Original language | Italian |
| Publisher | Vita e Pensiero |
| Number of pages | 50 |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
Keywords
- tworia dei giochi
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