Antitrust Appraisal of Mergers in Oligopolistic Markets

Michele Grillo, Lara Magnani

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this paper we ask whether and how there can be room for the notion of dominance to be sensibly applied to mergers in non-collusive oligopolies. We come to the somewhat unexpected conclusion that, even in oligopoly, the European test of 'dominance' is much closer to the US test of 'substantial lessening of competition' than is usually thought to be.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAntitrust Between EC Law and National Law
EditorsE.A. Raffaelli
Pages291-301
Number of pages11
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Keywords

  • Antitrust
  • Merger

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