Affidamento sull'intermediario e obblighi di informazione in executivis

Translated title of the contribution: [Autom. eng. transl.] Reliance on the intermediary and information obligations in executivis

Edoardo Grossule*

*Corresponding author

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

[Autom. eng. transl.] The contribution deals with the issue of configurability, at the expense of intermediaries, of a legal obligation of post-contractual information regarding the provision of an investment service of an executive nature. In other words, the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether, and in which cases, after the provision of the investment service, the intermediary is required to monitor the performance of the financial instrument and, in the event of substantial losses, inform the own customer. From the perspective of cost-benefit analysis, it is concluded that in light of the evolution of the notion of consultancy due to the intervention of CESR (now ESMA), information obligations can be configured in executivis, especially when the investor has particular needs for a protection, based on the collection of information that the intermediary must collect when providing the service.
Translated title of the contribution[Autom. eng. transl.] Reliance on the intermediary and information obligations in executivis
Original languageItalian
Pages (from-to)425-437
Number of pages13
JournalBANCA BORSA E TITOLI DI CREDITO
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Keywords

  • servizi di investimento

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