Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunali. Part I

Translated title of the contribution: [Autom. eng. transl.] Agreements, social rules, judges and courts. Set off
  • Carlo Luigi Beretta

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

Starting with a prisoner’s dilemma, a simple taxonomy of the possible characteristics of a game is introduced. This forms the basis for discussing repeated interactions and the emergence of personalised rules used in durable relationships. When by their nature, interactions are sporadic, much of the same results can be obtained by the use of social rules. Finally, the use of formal contracts, typically incomplete, and a third party to solve conflicts is outlined. The Appendix contains a summary introduction to the problem of incompleteness of norm systems.
Translated title of the contribution[Autom. eng. transl.] Agreements, social rules, judges and courts. Set off
Original languageItalian
PublisherVita e Pensiero Pubblic University:Largo Gemelli 1, I 20123 Milan Italy:011 39 02 72342310, 011 39 2 72342370, EMAIL: [email protected], Fax: 011 39 02 72342974
Number of pages49
ISBN (Print)978-88-343-3173-6
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Keywords

  • regole sociali

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of '[Autom. eng. transl.] Agreements, social rules, judges and courts. Set off'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this