Ability and Responsibility in General Action Logic

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In the last two decades logicians from different backgrounds have focused on the characterization of the notions of ability and responsibility. In the present paper I build on these lines of research and develop a system of modal logic of action which involves elements from both dynamic action logic and stit logic. The main advantage of the present system lies in the possibility of analysing the fact that an agent brings about a certain state of affairs in two distinct components: the fact that the agent performs a specific basic action and the fact that a state of affairs is a consequence of the performed action. This kind of analysis allows us to introduce a novel account of the notions of epistemic ability and knowingly doing and a comprehensive conceptual framework for classifying different levels of responsibility.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDeontic Logic and Normative Systems
EditorsCleo Condoravdi, Shyam Nair, Gabriella Pigozzi Jan Broersen
Pages121-138
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Keywords

  • ability
  • action logic
  • intentionality
  • knowingly doing
  • responsibility

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