A Security Paradox. The Influence Of Governance-Type Organized Crime Over The Surrounding Criminal Environment

Alberto Aziani, Serena Favarin, Gian Maria Campedelli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This study empirically demonstrates how governance-type organized crime groups (OCGs) operate as an enforcer against volume crimes in the communities they control and argues that their ability to mitigate volume crimes forms an integral component of controlling their territory in the long term. This is because the costs incurred from deterring other crimes a are offset by the tangible and intangible revenues that it facilitates. Indeed, combating volume crimes fosters an environment in which OCGs can conduct their activities unfettered by other criminals and law enforcement agencies, safeguard those businesses that pay them protection and curry favour amongst the population. Consequently, the present study verifies the validity of the security governance paradigm by conducting an econometric analysis of 11 different volume crimes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)970-993
Number of pages24
JournalBritish Journal of Criminology
Volume60
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Keywords

  • Italian mafias
  • crime specificity
  • extra-legal governance
  • governance-type OC
  • security governance
  • volume crimes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A Security Paradox. The Influence Of Governance-Type Organized Crime Over The Surrounding Criminal Environment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this