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Abstract

In this paper we address Fine’s well known objection to the modal approach to\r\nessence. We argue that it is possible to maintain the modal approach in spite of Fine’s counterexamples by developing a theory of qua-objects. In this theory the predicative nexus is explained in a more perspicuous way. The rebuttal of Fine’s counterexamples is achieved by building up a stratified view of essence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)189-197
Number of pages9
JournalRivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Fine
  • Logic of essence
  • essence
  • qua objects

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