The financial crisis of 2008 caught huge numbers of actors, both in the financial system and outside of it, entirely by surprise. A question repeatedly asked is "How did we not see it coming?" Part of the answer may lie in the inadequacies of the financial accounting information which was being made available, especially for banks and other financial institutions. In this chapter, we examine the whole question of the reliability and the relevance of financial accounting information in the role played threin by auditors, and how deficiencies in these may have contributed to the pre-crisis blissful ignorance. The deficiencies it will be argued are both technical and moral. Corporate governance has many managerial and juridical implications that impact profoundly on the control system of companies. The evolution of increasing regulation in the field of corporate control has, moreover, obvious implications for the institutional structures of companies. In addition to conducting a theoretical assessment of the problems posed by contemporary financial accounting and auditing practices, we will also have a look at some of the post-2008 initiatives for better corporate governance in all of these aspects; and we will make at least one key policy suggestion.
|Title of host publication||The Philosophy, Politics and Economics of Finance in the 21st Century|
|Editors||Patrick O'Sullivan, Nigel F.B. Allington, Mark. Esposito|
|Number of pages||12|
|Publication status||Published - 2015|